{
  "family": "quant",
  "sample_count": 12,
  "category": "ransomware",
  "description": "TrojanDownloader:Win32/Quant (commonly known as **Quant Loader**) is a highly successful, commercially available malware downloader. Heavily advertised and sold on Russian-speaking underground hacking forums (like Exploit.in), Quant Loader acts as an Initial Access Broker (IAB) tool. Threat actors purchase Quant Loader to reliably bypass endpoint security and silently deliver their chosen secondary payloads (such as Locky ransomware, Pony stealers, or Formbook) to infected machines.<br><br><b>Understanding Quant Loader</b><br>To an end-user, a Quant Loader infection is completely invisible; it operates silently in the background. For a threat intelligence analyst, Quant Loader is a significant threat because of its commercial 'Malware-as-a-Service' (MaaS) nature. The developer constantly updates the loader with new anti-analysis and evasion techniques to ensure buyers get a high infection rate. The buyers use a provided web panel to configure which secondary payloads Quant should download based on the victim's geolocation and OS version.<br><br><b>Execution and Evasion Strategies</b><br>Buyers typically distribute Quant Loader via massive malspam campaigns (using weaponized Word macros) or through exploit kits like RIG (`T1189`). Upon execution, Quant employs complex anti-sandboxing checks (`T1497.001`)—delaying execution, checking for mouse movement, and verifying it isn't running in a known analyst VM (VirtualBox/VMWare). It copies itself to the `%AppData%` directory and establishes persistence via Registry Run keys (`T1547.001`). Quant Loader then reaches out to its C2 panel (often hosted on compromised sites) to fetch the secondary payload (`T1105`). It frequently uses process hollowing or API unhooking to inject and execute this secondary payload without alerting EDR solutions (`T1055`).<br><br><b>Indicators of Compromise & Impact</b><br>The impact depends entirely on what the buyer configured Quant to download (ranging from data theft to enterprise ransomware). Incident responders should investigate EDR alerts for suspicious child processes spawning from Office applications. Network telemetry will show initial HTTP check-ins to the Quant panel, followed by the downloading of secondary executable files. The presence of randomly named binaries in `%AppData%` with associated Run keys is a strong IoC.",
  "cta": "Published by the SystemHelpdesk team.",
  "aliases": [],
  "enrichment_level": "expert-seo",
  "faq": [],
  "faq_count": 0,
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1547.001",
    "T1497.001",
    "T1105",
    "T1055",
    "T1566.001"
  ],
  "cisa_advisory": null,
  "last_updated": "2026-06-09",
  "mitre_attack_detail": [
    {
      "id": "T1105",
      "name": "Ingress Tool Transfer (Downloading the secondary payload)",
      "tactic": "Command and Control"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1497.001",
      "name": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks",
      "tactic": "Defense Evasion"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1055",
      "name": "Process Injection",
      "tactic": "Defense Evasion"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1547.001",
      "name": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys",
      "tactic": "Persistence"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1566.001",
      "name": "Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment",
      "tactic": "Initial Access"
    }
  ],
  "containment_steps": [
    "Isolate the endpoint immediately; if Quant Loader is detected, it has likely already downloaded and executed a high-severity secondary payload.",
    "Use EDR to trace the execution chain: what process launched Quant, and what secondary processes did Quant subsequently spawn or inject into?",
    "Review proxy logs for HTTP GET requests downloading `.exe` or `.dll` files immediately following the Quant infection timeline.",
    "Capture a memory dump (RAM) to identify the injected secondary payload and extract the C2 configuration."
  ],
  "what_to_avoid": [
    "Do not close the incident after removing the Quant executable; the primary threat is the secondary payload it delivered, which must also be identified and remediated.",
    "Avoid assuming the threat actor is the developer of Quant; they are likely a customer who purchased it on a forum."
  ],
  "target_industries": [
    "Global / Opportunistic"
  ],
  "motivation": "Opportunistic",
  "threat_actors": [
    "Unknown / Cybercriminal"
  ],
  "target_geographies": [
    "Global"
  ]
}