{
  "family": "vxidl",
  "sample_count": 1,
  "category": "advanced_threat",
  "description": "<h3>Executive Summary</h3>\nVxidl (often detected as VBS/Vxidl or Virus.VBS.Vxidl) is a classification for legacy script-based viruses and worms, typically written in VBScript (Visual Basic Script) or utilizing Microsoft's Interface Definition Language (IDL) components. While less sophisticated than modern compiled malware, these scripts are highly destructive, designed to rapidly propagate across local networks and aggressively sabotage the host operating system.\n\n<h3>Infection Vector and Technical Capabilities</h3>\nVxidl variants primarily propagate through email (as malicious attachments pretending to be documents or images) or by copying themselves to mapped network drives and removable media (USB drives).\n\nUpon execution by the Windows Script Host (`wscript.exe`), the malware operates rapidly:\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Mass Mailing (Worm Functionality):</strong> Similar to early macro viruses, Vxidl often accesses the Microsoft Outlook Address Book via COM objects, silently emailing copies of itself to all of the victim's contacts to fuel exponential spread.</li>\n<li><strong>File Overwriting and Vandalism:</strong> The core payload is often purely destructive. The script recursively searches local and network drives for specific file types (like `.doc`, `.xls`, `.jpg`, or `.mp3`) and overwrites their contents with malicious VBScript code, effectively destroying the original data while turning the files into new infection vectors.</li>\n<li><strong>System Instability:</strong> Vxidl frequently modifies the Windows Registry (e.g., altering `HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run`) to ensure it executes on startup. It may also intentionally delete critical system files to render the OS unbootable.</li>\n</ul>\n\n<h3>Threat Assessment</h3>\nWhile modern email gateways and hardened Windows configurations (which restrict the execution of unsigned VBScripts) mitigate the spread of Vxidl, an infection within an unpatched network is catastrophic. The file-overwriting payload causes permanent data loss that cannot be reversed without offline backups.\n\n<h3>Remediation and Eradication</h3>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Script Execution Policies:</strong> The most effective defense against Vxidl and similar script-based threats is to enforce strict Group Policies that disable the Windows Script Host or restrict the execution of `.vbs`, `.js`, and `.wsh` files associated with `wscript.exe`.</li>\n<li><strong>Network Containment:</strong> Immediately disconnect infected machines from the network to halt the worm's propagation via SMB shares and outbound email.</li>\n<li><strong>Data Restoration:</strong> Because the malware overwrites file contents rather than simply hiding or encrypting them, files \"infected\" by Vxidl are generally destroyed and must be restored from a secure backup.</li>\n</ul>",
  "cta": "Published by the SystemHelpdesk team.",
  "aliases": [
    "VBS.Vxidl",
    "Virus.VBS.Vxidl",
    "Worm.VBS"
  ],
  "enrichment_level": "insufficient_information",
  "faq": [],
  "faq_count": 0,
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1059.005",
    "T1485",
    "T1566.001",
    "T1114.003"
  ],
  "cisa_advisory": null,
  "last_updated": "2026-07-01T17:22:16Z",
  "type": "Virus / Worm (Script)",
  "target_industries": [
    "Global / Opportunistic"
  ],
  "motivation": "Opportunistic",
  "threat_actors": [
    "Unknown / Cybercriminal"
  ],
  "target_geographies": [
    "Global"
  ]
}