Lazagne

Overview

HackTool:Win32/Lazagne is an open-source, highly versatile **Credential Dumper** and password recovery utility available on GitHub. While designed for legitimate penetration testing and sysadmin password recovery, it is almost exclusively seen in the wild as a weaponized post-exploitation tool (`T1003`). Once an attacker breaches a network, they deploy Lazagne to automatically harvest saved passwords, SSH keys, and tokens from dozens of supported applications (browsers, chat clients, databases, sysadmin tools) stored on the compromised endpoint.

Understanding the Lazagne Threat
To an IT administrator, Lazagne might seem like a useful recovery utility. To a SOC analyst, the execution of `lazagne.exe` (or its Python script equivalent) is a 'Code Red' indicator of a severe, interactive network breach. It means an attacker has bypassed perimeter defenses, escalated privileges on a host, and is now attempting to harvest credentials to pivot laterally across the enterprise domain.

Execution and Credential Harvesting Mechanics
Lazagne is typically dropped onto a victim machine *after* an initial compromise (e.g., via a phishing payload or an RDP brute-force attack) (`T1105`). The attacker usually executes it from a command shell with administrative privileges (`T1059.003`). Lazagne then automatically iterates through its modules (`T1082`). It queries the Windows Registry (`T1012`), parses SQLite databases used by browsers like Chrome and Firefox (`T1555.003`), extracts Wi-Fi profiles (`T1555.004`), and decrypts stored credentials using the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) (`T1555.004`). It outputs the harvested credentials in cleartext to the console or a text file for the attacker to exfiltrate.

Indicators of Compromise & Impact
The primary impact is the mass compromise of user identities, potentially granting the attacker Domain Admin privileges if an admin recently logged into the box. Host-based IoCs include EDR alerts for the execution of `lazagne.exe` (often renamed to evade simple blacklists), or alerts for anomalous processes querying multiple browser profile directories and DPAPI functions in rapid succession. The presence of a newly created `passwords.txt` or `creds.json` file in a temporary directory is a strong indicator.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1003: Monitor for LSASS memory dumping or registry SAM extraction. Enable Credential Guard on Windows systems.
• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

Generated Detections (Boilerplate)

These YARA and Sigma rules are auto-generated based on the family name and aliases. They must be heavily tuned before deployment in a production environment.

YARA Rule

rule MALWARE_WIN_LAZAGNE {
    meta:
        description = "Detects Lazagne (advanced_threat)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Boilerplate Generator"
        date = "2026-07-06"
    strings:
        $s1 = "lazagne" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: Suspicious Lazagne Activity
id: dccfe40b25a34315d1ce2ef7f75e20ff
status: experimental
description: Detects generic indicators of the lazagne malware family.
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - "*lazagne*"
    condition: selection
level: medium

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately isolate the endpoint from the network; if Lazagne was executed, an attacker has interactive control.
2. Assume all credentials stored on or entered into the compromised machine have been stolen. Force an immediate password reset for the user's Active Directory account.
3. If an IT administrator recently logged into the compromised machine via RDP or PsExec, you must assume the Domain Admin credentials were also dumped.
4. Search EDR logs enterprise-wide for the specific file hash of the Lazagne executable found, as the attacker likely deployed it to multiple machines.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not allow users to save corporate passwords in web browsers; enforce the use of secure, enterprise password managers that do not store credentials in easily parsed SQLite files.
2. Avoid treating Lazagne detection as a 'low severity' PUA/HackTool alert; it is a critical indicator of post-exploitation activity.

References & External Analysis

• Search "lazagne" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Families (Category: advanced_threat)

Explore other malware families in the same category:

• Widdit
• Convertad
• Xunleihd
• Rootkitdrv
• Globalupdate

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://jordan123234-malware-families-explorer.static.hf.space/api/lazagne.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.